

**Who Protests Whom in Challenges to the Liberal International Order? Liberalization, Economic Deprivation, and the Targeting of Political and Economic Actors at World Heritage Sites**

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**ABSTRACT**

We empirically test for the mechanisms underlying protest against the liberal international economic order in a context where we can causally isolate the mobilizing role of relative economic deprivation and identify both the source and target of expressed conflict. Using a difference-in-difference design at a fine-grained geographic level of analysis we show that micro-level geographic locations “treated” with the inscription of cultural and natural heritage sites of outstanding universal value onto the World Heritage list experience an increase in conflict originating from labor organizations who frequently perceive their share of tourism benefits to be unfair or inadequate towards intergovernmental organizations, national governments and businesses who either economically benefit from the liberalization, are supporters of those who benefit or are associated with that liberalization. These results provide causal evidence in support of greater efforts to compensate the losers of economic liberalization *ex ante* both in proximity to World Heritage sites and, we argue, for those negatively impacted by liberalization more broadly.

One of the unresolved questions surrounding the liberal international order is whether it increases or decreases the risk of conflict (Bussmann & Schneider, 2007). On the one hand, the resources provided by accessing global markets should aid in addressing grievances, thereby dampening conflict. However, other theories argue that redistributive economic processes aggravate historical grievances, thereby promoting conflict. The existing literature largely suggests that the adoption of liberal policy reforms is frequently followed by protest, backlash and, in some cases, violent conflict and government or even regime collapse (Wood, 2013). In some cases, liberal policies are rolled back leading to increased statism and protectionism that threaten the liberal economic order (Lake et al., 2021). However, these correlations fall short of causal evidence because the reforms and liberalizations are typically preceded by negative economic conditions that may be the actual cause of protest and efforts. Attempts to address this with a selection model are fraught due to the difficulty of fully capturing the heterogeneous preexisting conditions driving reform.

As a result, the guidance available to policymakers from this research on how they might avoid or mitigate protests to reform is equivocal. One potential answer with substantive policy implications is that winners from liberalization who make efforts to compensate or deflect the anger of the losers can avoid or at least mitigate protests and backlash. However, efforts to assess the empirical support for such arguments and policy interventions struggle because of the empirical challenge of identifying the identity of actors who win and lose from redistributive economic processes and the timing of those losses and wins. As a result, large-N empirical analyses have struggled to formally test the merits of these arguments thereby undermining confidence in the potential policy remedy or treatment.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For a partial exception, see Reinsberg, Stubbs & Bujnoch (2023) that construct proxies to separate the effect of deprivation from alienation finding support for both mechanisms.

This paper uses micro-level data to causally demonstrate that the redistributive effects of the opening of the liberal order promote conflict even in the presence of substantial resource inflows. We leverage a novel empirical context, the inscription of sites onto the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) World Heritage List, as the impact of the liberal economic order is both temporally and geographically identified, relatively immediate, and has known distributional consequences. We then compare the resulting variation in media-reported conflict expressed by these groups and towards others groups at that location before and after the liberalization event. Our analysis reveals that the impact of redistributive economic processes on conflict dominates any conflict-mitigating impact of resource inflow at least in the short-term. This result heightens calls for more attention to alleviating short-term relative economic deprivation as part of the economic and political calculus of liberalization.

### **Multilateral organizations and challenges to the liberal international order**

An abundance of recent scholarship has established that the liberal international order is being challenged by both internal and external threats (Lake et al., 2021). Internal threats include the rise of populist, nationalist and authoritarian parties, particularly within core states (Adler & Drieschova, 2021; Broz et al., 2021; Farrell & Newman, 2021; Flaherty & Rogowski, 2021; Goodman & Pepinsky, 2021). External threats include technological change (Mansfield & Rudra, 2021), climate change (Colgan et al., 2021), the rise of China as a global power (Lake, 2018; Weiss & Wallace, 2021), the rise of "outside" powers such as Russia, Turkey and Venezuela (Búzás, 2021; Tourinho, 2021), and COVID-19. These threats collectively have significantly undermined multilateral institutions and generated backlash against the liberal international order (Lake et al., 2021).

Lake et al. (2021) argue that an important reason that the liberal international order finds itself under challenge is the liberal bias inherent in the order, or the reality that the rules of the order are designed to favor countries and groups within countries that support democracy, globalization and other liberal principles. ‘Liberal blinders’ in regard to this bias have led scholars to under-study liberalization’s distributional consequences. Though we frequently assume that democratization, opening to the international economy and liberalization produces economic opportunity which can be used to compensate any losers, they argue that “sets of policies and practices that constitute cooperation and normative practices will almost always have unequal consequences for different countries and for groups within those countries” (Lake et al, 2021, page 248). Furthermore, political biases lead to inadequate efforts to use any gains to sufficiently compensate losers. These distributional effects and the political calculus behind them generate short-term backlash (Broz, Frieden and Weymouth 2021; Flaherty and Rogowski 2021).

This argument already offers important implication for scholars or policymakers seeking to diminish protests associated with the liberal economic order: compensate the losers. However, the empirical evidence that the losers from liberalization are behind the protests is scant. Furthermore, protests are not driven solely by motivation of the protestors but also their ability to coalesce around opposition to something. Efforts to diffuse such protests should focus not only on the source and their motivation but also their perception of and relationships with their targets in that protest.

### **Sources of Protest: Liberalization and Economic Deprivation**

The challenge of liberalization links back to the seminal role of economic deprivation on conflict more generally (Gurr, 1970). Specifically, distributional consequences of liberalization create grievances by actors comparing their current economic or social status or

perceptions of their future status to what they perceive they would or should have had in the absence of reform. Resentment over the difference between these levels triggers resentment which manifests as domestic opposition and unrest (Broz et al., 2020; Putnam, 1988; Vries et al., 2021).

Empirical analyses of this theoretical prediction on the challenges to the liberal economic order have primarily examined backlash against the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization (Broz et al., 2020). These empirical studies typically focus on the link between the timing of an IMF conditionality agreement (i.e., adjustment or austerity plan) or an agreement to join the WTO or otherwise liberalize trade and the subsequent evolution of economic and/or political protests in a country.

IMF conditionality often imposes structural adjustments that include domestic policy changes such as privatization, reduction of subsidies, currency devaluation and higher prices for basic goods which have short-term distributional consequences (Auvinen, 1996; Balasundharam & Antoun de Almeida, 2018; Béjar & Moraes, 2016). This structural adjustment has led to well-known ‘austerity protests’ (Walton & Seddon, 1994; Wood, 2013) by the losers. Often the losers, whose exact composition is highly contextually dependent, are nevertheless concentrated in the middle and lower classes of urban population centers facilitating collective action and protest (Auvinen, 1996) which can even escalate to violent conflict (Hartzell et al., 2010). These protests may be aggravated by a sense of nationalism and/or procedural injustice in that the impetus for the disruption is foreign and those harmed had little voice in the decision that is impacting them.

In the case of the liberal free trade regime, agreements to join the World Trade Organization or sign multilateral trade agreements or otherwise liberalize trade have similarly generated domestic backlash and even violence (Bussman & Schneider, 2007). After trade

liberalization, exporters win and importers lose leading importing producers and labor to engage in protest which may be reinforced or supported by nationalists or a sense of procedural injustice. Once again, the precise identity of exporting and importing industries will vary across countries but the political power of the previously protected importers will manifest as protest or violence during periods of trade liberalization (Bussman & Schneider, 2007). Similar arguments are made in the case of capital account liberalization (Henisz & Mansfield, 2006).

In each instance, the long-term benefits of liberalization (Alesina et al., 2020) are uncertain and not readily available in practice to compensate short-term losers. This leaves open the question as to whether economic grievances outweigh economic opportunity or only win out due to sequence (Caren et al., 2017). Additionally, in both cases, there is the possibility that the economic underperformance which caused the need to reach out to the IMF, the long-term trends in trade exposure, or even technological change bear substantial responsibility for the protests. If this is the case, protests, while triggered by the IMF or trade liberalization agreement, in reality, have a common unobserved and unmodeled antecedent as those agreements. We offer a more precise hypothesis consistent with the role of economic grievances in triggering protests.

*H1: Protest from economic interest groups at (perceived) risk of loss from liberalization increases following a liberalization event.*

### **Targets of Protests: International and Domestic Political and Economic Actors**

One of the challenges of analyzing and diagnosing the drivers of protest against the liberal economic order is not only the diversity of sources of protest but also a diversity of targets. While knowing who protests is obviously important to help designing policies or interventions that avoid or mitigate conflict, knowing whom they protest against may also generate important insights. If targeted actors consciously improve their relationships with

those who are the source of conflict *ex ante*, the strength of those relationships may help weather the strain imposed by liberalizing policies.

The backlash is argued to target three types of actors: the multilateral organization that is perceived responsible (the International Monetary Fund or World Trade Organization) and may be scapegoated by political leaders, the government that actually agreed to and implemented the policy (Walton & Seddon, 1994; Wood, 2013), and local ‘winners’ who (are perceived to) have benefitted (unfairly) from the policy.

Targets symbolize agents of austerity policy and the international economy: government buildings, the treasury and national palace, the legislature. [...] When protests take the form of violent direct action, crowds focus on their immediate grievances and local communities. Looting is aimed at supermarkets, clothing and furniture stores, gasoline stations, and banks.” (Walton & Shefner, 1994, pp. 110–111)

One of the few studies to examine the relative importance of different targets based on a study of media reports of 281 Latin American protests against liberalization from 1995-2001 (Almeida, 2007) finds that the national government was the most common target but the targeting of intergovernmental organizations was steadily increasing over time. Furthermore, in many cases, multiple targets were present in the same protest. A more recent study which does not restrict its sample to protests against the liberal economic order (Ortiz et al., 2022) similarly finds national governments as the dominant target but suggests that companies are rising in frequency as a target and have surpassed intergovernmental organizations.

Actors may protest against international governmental organizations because they perceive their power over national policymaking to have been illegitimate (Tallberg & Zürn, 2019). This illegitimacy is linked both to the unelected or non-participatory processes and to the power imbalance which favors wealthier countries at the expense of the poorer countries who are typically asked to bear greater adjustment costs (Copelovitch, 2010; Dreher et al., 2015; McDowell, 2017; Stone, 2004). Such protests may be further overlaid with nationalist

or populist elements militating against foreign and/or elite influence over national policymaking (Copelovitch & Pevehouse, 2019; Hooghe et al., 2019).

*H2a: Protest towards intergovernmental organizations increases following a liberalization event.*

A similar sense of illegitimacy or violation may also lead protestors to target the domestic government (Petras & Brill, 1986; Vreeland, 2003). Protestors who perceive that national political leaders are pursuing a liberal agenda at the expense of domestic constituents are likely to associate adoption of liberalizing policies as a sign of weakness and/or a willingness to sacrifice the interests of its own supporters in the face of foreign pressure (Ortiz & Béjar, 2013). Such concessions can enhance a perception of (elite and foreign) violations of national sovereignty (Reinsberg et al., 2022). Concessions can also be a sign of government incompetence (Dreher et al., 2012). In any event, national governments can expect to be targeted by protestors to liberalization.

*H2b: Protest towards national governments increases following a liberalization event.*

The third group of targets (i.e., the economic interests that benefit from liberalization) is the least analyzed empirically especially within the discipline of political science. While the same scholars who focus on relative economic deprivation identify exporters and elite business interests as benefitting from liberalization (Walton & Shefner, 1994; Bussman & Schneider, 2007), there is limited empirical evidence that they are targeted by protests outside of Ortiz et al. (2022). By contrast, within management, Henisz & Zelner (2005) argue and Zelner, Henisz and Holburn (2009) demonstrate that a lack legitimacy for business at the time of liberalization (i.e., privatization of public utilities) increases the likelihood of policy backsliding or retrenchment. Even here though, there is no quantitative evidence of businesses being targeted. The consequences of this omission are potentially profound in so far as evidence of such

targeting might encourage such interests, including powerful business and financial actors, who clearly benefit from liberalization, to more proactively engage in defense of the liberal economic order.

*H2c: Protest towards economic interest groups who (are perceived to) benefit from liberalization increases following a liberalization event.*

While existing theories of protests against the liberal economic order center around the redistributive effects of the liberal order generating grievances among economic losers towards the political and economic actors responsible for or benefitting from policy reform, limited quantitative empirical evidence has actually demonstrated the micro elements of these protests as specified here. In the case of the IMF, both the future timing of returns and the precise short-term distributional impacts are unobserved. Similarly, in the case of trade liberalization, despite progress in identifying winners and losers by geography, the link between location and political action beyond voting in the US, UK and, in one study, the EU remains unexplored (Autor et al., 2020; Ballard-Rosa et al., 2021; Broz et al., 2021; Colantone & Stanig, 2018; Jensen et al., 2017). In both cases, there is also the confound caused by either the short-term economic crisis that led to the austerity program or long-term decline of some industries due to trade exposure. To better test this theory, and thus better understand the micro-foundations of the backlash against the liberal international order, we need an empirical strategy that allows us to observe cases without pre-existing economic strain, with defined liberalization events, that have clear winners and losers, whose involvement as a source or target of the backlash is clear as well as whether that backlash is directed at intergovernmental organizations, national governments and economic interests benefitting from liberalization.

We leverage a unique sample that meets these stringent criteria: the sectoral response of political and economic stakeholders to the inscription of UNESCO World Heritage sites.<sup>2</sup> While World Heritage sites are nominated by national governments and inscribed on the World Heritage List following multilateral debate, they are, by definition, site-specific, and thus generate a concentrated geographic impact quite distinct from most cases of the liberal international order that transform economies as a whole. In addition to clear spatial resolution, because World Heritage sites have defined and public timelines for the process toward inscription, we have excellent temporal resolution on when the backlash should, in theory, commence. World Heritage sites are a promising sample for us to get resolution into the micro-foundations of the backlash against the liberal international order.

This paper presents a micro study of backlash as a result of the much theorized but under-studied distributional consequences of the liberal international order. It leverages the unique characteristics of World Heritage sites to understand the domestic backlash generated by international organizations against not only the organizations themselves, but governments perceived as complicit and local economic “winners.” Specifically, it causally identifies the impact of the treatment of a narrow geographic location within a country with the designation of a World Heritage site and links the timing of this treatment to an increase in media-reported conflict originating within the labor sector and targeting intergovernmental organizations, government, and business.

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<sup>2</sup> It may, at first, seem odd to discuss the effects of UNESCO World Heritage inscription in the same breath as International Monetary Fund conditionality or the World Trade Organization given that UNESCO may be more traditionally portrayed as a cultural and educational organization rather than an economic one. However, while there is debate as to whether World Heritage sites are motivated by an economic logic, they certainly have economic consequences for the communities in which they are inscribed as they yield far greater tourism revenue and necessitate much greater tourism infrastructure.

## **The World Heritage Program**

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was founded in 1945 in London as a UN specialized agency for educational and cultural cooperation. The goal was the intellectual and moral restoration of a world in ruins after the devastations of WWII (Meskell, 2018). As stated in its constitution, UNESCO was created to fulfill a conscious political purpose: the promotion of education, science and culture, functional to the maintenance of peace and security (UNESCO Constitution, Article I, Purposes and functions). UNESCO's major contribution is considered to be its pioneering of international legal instruments in the form of Conventions and Recommendations. The 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention) is considered the Organization's flagship program. The purpose of the Convention is to protect cultural and natural heritage sites of global significance for humanity. The Convention is based on the recognition that protection of cultural and natural heritage is of outstanding universal value. By ratifying the World Heritage Convention, each nation pledged not only to conserve the World Heritage sites within its borders but also to protect its national heritage more broadly (Choay, 2001; Meskell, 2018).

State Parties to the World Heritage Convention can submit proposals for nomination of sites to the World Heritage List, placing them under the protection of the global community. In order to be inscribed on the World Heritage List, a site must be of outstanding universal value and meet at least one of ten criteria. Sites must also fulfill the conditions of authenticity and/or integrity and ensure that proper management structures are put in place. Inclusion of cultural and natural sites on the List is the result of a selection process that occurs during the annual session of the World Heritage Committee. The Committee is made up of 21 States Party representatives that serve a four-year term. The Committee's mandate is to oversee the implementation of the Convention, to decide on new nominations to the World Heritage List,

to oversee monitoring and managing of sites already on the List, and to consider the need for special measures regarding sites on the List of World Heritage in Danger, including allocating funds from the World Heritage Fund.

Experts from UNESCO's official Advisory Bodies (ICOMOS, IUCN and ICCROM) conduct technical evaluations of nominations to the World Heritage List. They offer recommendations based on one of four outcomes: Inscription, Referral, Deferral and Not to Inscribe. Nonetheless, it is the World Heritage Committee who formally makes the final decisions on inscriptions to the List. Decisions Not to Inscribe indicate that a site does not meet any of the criteria and therefore a State Party may not resubmit the proposed property again. Recommendations such as Referral and Deferral, allow State Parties to resubmit the nomination at future sessions of the Committee, provided that they offer additional information or substantially revise the nomination dossier. The World Heritage Centre was established in 1992 and tasked with coordinating all World Heritage-related matters within UNESCO. The World Heritage Centre is responsible for day-to-day management, organizing yearly sessions of the World Heritage Committee and its Bureau, and advising State Parties on the preparation of site nominations. Additionally, the World Heritage Centre coordinates international assistance from the World Heritage Fund and reports on the condition of sites and the need of emergency actions when a site is threatened.

The increased prestige of the List has come at a high cost and the Convention has faced unprecedented challenges in the last fifty years. New threats to the preservation of heritage sites from both industrial development and conflict have intensified. Funding requests for international assistance have skyrocketed. In addition, the 2011 controversy over the recognition of Palestine as a full member of UNESCO prompted the suspension of US financial contributions to the organization and its eventual withdrawal from the organization in 2019. The loss in revenues has pushed the organization into fiscal crisis (Eckhard et al., 2019; Luke

& Kersel, 2012). As a result, UNESCO has increasingly turned to industry partnerships as a funding mechanism and shifted its focus from preserving culture to promote peace to one that promotes development and relies less on states and more on markets (i.e., tourism) (Fawcett, 2009).

Political lobbying and alliances based on geography, religion, trade partnerships or anti-Western sentiment have influenced collective decision making and international responsibility. Decisions are increasingly taken along political lines rather than based upon conservation priorities and expert evaluations (Hølleland et al., 2019; Meskell, 2018, p. 79; Meskell & Liuzza, 2022). The ideal of collective responsibility, both ethical and fiscal, once so central to the ideals of the Convention, has lost ground, while inscription of sites on the List has become embroiled in multilateral negotiations and diplomacy (Bertacchini et al., 2016; Liuzza & Meskell, 2021; Meskell et al., 2015). Since the Committee of 21 nations is the most powerful decision maker, the World Heritage Centre has been unable to combat these developments.

Today the Convention is caught between the overarching aims of international cooperation and the machinations of economic and national interests, with dire consequences for heritage properties. UNESCO has implemented programs to address the imbalance in the geographical representation of World Heritage properties and attempted to improve the long-term financial sustainability and the Convention (Labadi, 2012; Liuzza, 2020). Yet these strategies have largely failed (Labadi, 2022). Today preservation goals are eclipsed by the potential economic benefits of listing. Moreover, nations increasingly seek to leverage not only UNESCO inscription, but the processes surrounding it, for their own international socio-political ambitions (Meskell and Liuzza 2022). With almost 1200 sites on the World Heritage list, generalizing the impacts of inscription is challenging since World Heritage sites vary considerably and are reliant on various national and local variables. While World Heritage listing has temporarily prevented risky developments and mining projects, it has also worsened

tourism-related issues and led to human-rights violations (Bille Larsen, 2022; Disko & Ooft, 2018; Gravari-Barbas et al., 2016; Vrdoljak et al., 2021). Ultimately, determining who gains and who loses from World Heritage listing is difficult since any evaluation must consider not only economic benefits but those pertaining to human rights and well-being. It is in this fraught context that we explore the impact of site inscription on conflict between political and economic actors.

## **Data**

As we are interested in the spatially precise effects of World Heritage inscription, we divide the world into PRIO-GRID cells (Tollefsen et al., 2012). Since its release in 2012, the PRIO-GRID structure has been used extensively in the social sciences given the ease with which it facilitates subnational panel analyses. The PRIO-GRID is a spatial grid of 259,200 cells that each account for 0.5 by 0.5 degrees of latitude and longitude, or approximately 50 kilometers by 50 kilometers. Of these 259,200 cells, just under 25 percent contain some land, yielding 64,818 grid cells in which we can record human interactions. As such, we are capturing the activity both pertaining to the World Heritage site itself as well as the activity immediately adjacent to the World Heritage site, which we believe to be the most appropriate measure. The PRIO-GRID structure also allows for seamless incorporation of time-varying spatial control variables released by PRIO, which include GDP, diamond and gold deposits, drought, and more. Our unit of analysis is the PRIO-GRID cell-year, and we have 2,100,000 observations spanning 1990-2020.

Our dependent variable is the annual degree of conflict or cooperation on the interval  $[-10, 10]$  where  $-10$  is the maximum amount of conflict (consider events such as declaration of war) and  $+10$  is the maximum amount of cooperation (consider events such as signing of a peace treaty). This scale of conflict and cooperation is known as the Goldstein scale (Goldstein,

1992) and is well-established in the social science literature (D’Orazio & Yonamine, 2015). A outline of the Goldstein scale is provided in **Appendix Figure 1**. We rely on the event coding from the GDELT-EVENTS database (Leetaru, 2015). For an extensive discussion of the validity of this data see Odziemkowska & Henisz (2021). GDELT-EVENTS codes events from worldwide media in more than 60 languages every 15 minutes. As such, our sample draws on more than four billion media articles.

GDELT uses the CAMEO typology to identify both the subject and the object involved in the event by actor type. As per our theoretical framework, we are specifically interested in the following actor categories: intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), government, business (including MNCs), and labor, which, given the available typology, is the best possible proxy for economic actors.<sup>3</sup> The CAMEO definitions of each of these groups are provided in **Table 1** below. Each actor is classified as the “source” or the “target” of the conflict, based on sentence position as subject or object. For example, in the (fictional) sentence “Al Shabab attacked Coca Cola,” the subject (Al Shabab) would be the *source* of the action, and the object (Coca Cola) would be the *target* of the action. Further, each of these actors would be grouped into an actor category: in this case, Al Shabab would be coded as “rebels” and Coca Cola would be coded as “multinational corporation (MNC).” As such, this GDELT-EVENT record would be coded as action from rebels (source) to a multinational corporation (target). The verb, “attacked,” would be coded as per the Goldstein scale lexicon on the scale of [-10, 10] as -6, which indicates conflict.

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<sup>3</sup> The full range of CAMEO actors includes intergovernmental organizations, opposition groups, civilians, educational institutions, environmental groups, human rights groups, legislators, refugees, multinational corporations, rebels, agriculture groups, development organizations, elites, healthcare organizations, labor unions, media, and government.

**Table 1: CAMEO actor definitions**

IGOs	International or regional inter-governmental organization (including United Nations organizations)
Government	The executive, governing parties, coalitions partners, executive divisions
Business	Businesses, businessmen & enterprises, including multinational corporations
Labor	Individuals in, or elements of, organized labor; organizations concerned with labor issues

The main independent variable is an indicator variable called World Heritage Site, which indicates whether a World Heritage site existed in a given PRIO-GRID cell in a given year. This data is based on the official UNESCO coding, which is publicly available on the UNESCO website. If the given PRIO GRID-cell had at least one UNESCO heritage site in a given year, the cell will take a 1. If not, it will take a zero. If a site was on inscribed in cell  $x$  in the year 1995, the GRID-cell years for cell  $x$  would take a 0 in the years 1990-1994, and a 1 from 1995 onwards. There are three instances in the data of a World Heritage site being "un-inscribed." For robustness, we also create a count variable that represents the number of World Heritage sites in a given PRIO-GRID cell year, with the maximum number of sites in one grid-cell year being four. The results are robust to inclusion of a count variable rather than an indicator variable.

Our secondary independent variables pertain to properties of the World Heritage sites and properties of the government hosting the site. UNESCO classifies each World Heritage site as cultural, natural, or mixed. A cultural site typically involves monuments, which could be architecture, art, or science pieces, and a natural site is a designation for places that are of "Outstanding Universal Value from the aesthetic or scientific point of view" (UNESCO). We account for this in our coding, again using the official data from the UNESCO World Heritage

Center website.<sup>4</sup> Finally, we generate a variable for whether a site is considered by UNESCO to be in danger, which we use in the robustness checks. All of these variables come directly from UNESCO's publicly-available data. We are also interested in whether the results vary by the regime type of the government hosting the site. As such, we use data from Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) (Coppedge et al., 2015). We use V-DEM's three-category electoral democracy variable, which divides regimes into democracies, anocracies and autocracies. This varies each year.

We control for factors that could affect both our dependent variable (degree of conflict and cooperation) and our independent variables (UNESCO world heritage site existence). As such, we control at the PRIO GRID-cell year level for gross domestic product (GDP) (logged), population size (logged), and the number of ethnic groups excluded from political power. In the robustness checks we also control for the number of armed conflict events using the Armed Conflict Location & Events Data (ACLED) (Raleigh, 2010). The count of politically excluded groups comes from Vogt et al, 2015. We measure GDP as the logged level Gross Domestic Product adjusted for purchasing power parity (Nordhaus, 2006). Our population measure is logged and is from HYDE (Klein Goldewijk et al., 2017). In all cases we extended the data through 2020 using the original sources. This involved taking the original data in its spatial formats and converting it to a spreadsheet format at the correct spatial resolution. Descriptive statistics of all variables are available in **Table 2** below.

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<sup>4</sup> <https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/>

**Table 2: Descriptive statistics**

Variable	Mean	Max	Min	SD	N
Conflict from labor	0.092	10.000	-10.000	3.536	255469
Conflict toward business	1.497	10.000	-10.000	2.996	500034
Conflict toward IGOs	1.801	10.000	-10.000	3.101	272214
Conflict toward government	1.101	10.000	-10.000	2.637	680649
World Heritage site	0.010	1.000	0.000	0.101	2074149
GDP (ln)	13.913	24.940	4.690	2.658	2073829
Population (ln)	7.591	16.954	-13.633	3.948	2074129
Excluded groups	0.385	6.000	0.000	0.569	2074149
UNESCO danger list	0.001	1.000	0.000	0.024	2074149
Cultural site	0.009	4.000	0.000	0.100	2074149
Natural site	0.011	4.000	0.000	0.112	2074149
Electoral democracy	0.533	1.000	0.000	0.413	1995654

## Research Design

We use a difference-in-difference panel ordinary least squares (OLS) research design, employing both grid cell and year fixed effects. The grid cell fixed effects hold everything else about the grid cell constant while the year fixed effects control for larger macroeconomic trends. The equation for this can be found **Equation 1** below. Depending on the model specification, we lag or lead the independent variable(s) of interest. To avoid selecting on the dependent variable, we include all grid cell-years, including those in which there are not world heritage sites.

### Equation 1: Difference-in-difference design


$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta T_i + \gamma t_i + \delta (T_i \cdot t_i) + \varepsilon_i$$

## Results

This section presents our econometric findings, which collectively support our overarching **Hypothesis 1** (protest from economic interest groups at (perceived) risk of loss from liberalization increases following a liberalization event). Next, consistent with **Hypothesis 2a** (protest towards intergovernmental organizations increases following a liberalization event), we find increasing conflict directed toward IGOs, which CAMEO defines as “international or regional inter-governmental organizations.” We note that this list includes United Nations

organizations. When we say conflict directed towards IGOs, we mean that IGOs were the target of the event (the object of the sentence). The coefficient plot shown in **Figure 1** presents only the coefficient for our indicator variable for World Heritage inscription (see **Appendix Table 1** for the full results) and the models presented are otherwise identical except for the number of lags or leads included. **As Figure 1** shows, we observe conflict toward IGOs for the three years leading up to World Heritage inscription. However, we do observe statistically significant long-run cooperation. Secondary analyses confirm that conflict toward IGOs occurs equally in natural and cultural sites. Further, we find that though conflict toward IGOs occurs in both democracies and autocracies, it is more severe in autocracies.


**Figure 1: Conflict toward IGOs as an effect of inscription**



Second, congruent with **Hypothesis 2b** (protest towards national governments increases following a liberalization event), we find increasing conflict directed toward governments, which CAMEO defines as “the executive, governing parties, coalitions partners, and executive divisions.” To reiterate, when we say conflict directed towards the government,

we mean that the government was the target of the event (the object of the sentence). As before, the coefficient plot shown in **Figure 2** presents only the coefficient for our indicator variable for World Heritage inscription (see **Appendix Table 2** for the full results) and the models presented are otherwise identical except for the number of lags included. As **Figure 2** shows, we observe conflict toward the government as an effect of World Heritage site inscription starting in the year before inscription and carrying on for six years after inscription. Over time, we see conflict moving toward cooperation, though this cooperation never achieves statistical significance. Secondary analyses confirm that conflict toward government occurs equally in natural and cultural sites. Further, we find that though conflict toward the government occurs in both democracies and autocracies, it is more severe in autocracies but persists longer in democracies.


**Figure 2: Conflict toward government as an effect of inscription**



Third, congruent with **Hypothesis 2c** (protest towards economic interest groups who (are perceived to) benefit from liberalization increases following a liberalization event), we find increasing conflict directed toward business. To reiterate, business in this context means


businesses, businessmen & enterprises, including multinational corporations. When we say conflict directed towards business, we mean that business was the target of the event (the object of the sentence). As before, the coefficient plot shown in **Figure 3** presents only the coefficient for our indicator variable for World Heritage inscription (see **Appendix Table 3** for the full results) and the models presented are otherwise identical except for the number of lags included. As **Figure 3** shows, we observe conflict toward business as an effect of World Heritage site inscription in the year after inscription and the second year after inscription. Over time, we see conflict moving toward cooperation, though this cooperation never achieves statistical significance. Secondary analyses confirm that this finding is driven primarily by natural sites (as opposed to cultural sites). Further, we find that though conflict toward business occurs in both democracies and autocracies, it is more severe & persists longer in autocracies.

**Figure 3: Conflict toward business as an effect of inscription**



Finally, we find that inscription of UNESCO sites is correlated with conflict from labor, which we use as our best available proxy for local economic actors. To reiterate, “labor” includes individuals in, or elements of, organized labor as well as organizations concerned with labor issues (Schrodt, 2012). When we say conflict “from” labor, we mean that labor is the *source* of the action (the subject of the sentence) in the event. The coefficient plot shown in **Figure 4** presents only the coefficient for our indicator variable for World Heritage inscription (see **Appendix Table 4** for the full results). The models presented are otherwise identical except for the number of lags included. As shown in **Figure 4** below, we observe conflict from labor in the year of inscription as well as the year after. The second year after inscription also has a negative coefficient that reaches statistical significance at the 10% level. Importantly, we see no effect on conflict and labor in the years leading up to inscription. Further, we see a return to no effect from the third year after inscription, suggesting that the conflict effect is relatively short-term. These results are robust to various specifications, including controlling for armed conflict and danger (discussed in the following section).

**Figure 4: Conflict from labor as an effect of inscription**



We further investigate whether this finding is exacerbated under certain conditions. As described above, we created an indicator variable based on UNESCO's coding as to whether the World Heritage site is considered "cultural" or "natural." We split the sample into cultural sites only and natural sites only (for the purposes of this analysis only we omit "mixed" sites) and re-estimate the models. We find that conflict from labor occurs equally in cultural sites. We also split the sample into autocracies and democracies as per VDEM's electoral democracy variable and re-estimate the models. We find that conflict from labor occurs primarily in democracies, which is consistent with the scholarship that suggests that labor politics are more developed within democracies.

### **Empirical concerns and robustness tests**

There are a variety of important limitations to our approach which we attempt to address with supplemental analyses. First, there are legitimate concerns about bias in traditional media sources. Not all voices will be reflected in media accounts particularly, but not exclusively, in countries with less media freedom, though these concerns are abated somewhat by inclusion of domestic and international sources (Leetaru & Schrod, 2013). This concern is less of a problem in our difference-in-difference research design, which compares each cell to past versions of itself. As such, if we were to assume that country  $x$ , and within it cell  $x$ , had media that is biased positively, we are still comparing biased media to biased media over time to see whether there is an effect. To further assuage this concern, we repeat the analysis using only countries that score a 2 or lower on VDEM's Government Internet filtering capacity measure, and the results are robust.

A related concern is that media is, in general, biased toward negativity (Van der Meer et al., 2020). This is because media outlets are more likely to cover conflict and other shocking news. First, we note that the mean level of conflict cooperation in our sample is actually

positive (i.e., cooperative) not conflictual. An important difference in our sample is its reliance on all media reported sentences as opposed to solely headlines (on page one) which tend to be more conflictually biased. Furthermore, there are not strong theoretical reasons to assume that the degree of negativity bias should vary dramatically, on average, across locations, which are all covered by more than fifty sources. We assume that that, on the whole, the Goldstein score produces a measure that is biased downward toward conflict, but our difference-in-difference research design again helps us because we are comparing the sentiment in a grid-cell relative to itself.

Some readers might be concerned that the “conflict” that GDELT-EVENTS is detecting is driven primarily by active armed conflict. Armed conflict is clearly an issue for World Heritage, but should not drive conclusions about the agency of businesses in this realm. As such, we re-estimated all models controlling for armed conflict events at the grid-cell year, as measured by the ACLED project (Raleigh, 2010). To create our variable, we mapped the latitude and longitude provided by ACLED in the original database to its corresponding PRIO grid cell, following the methodology of Tollefsen et al. (2012). We then counted the number of ACLED events in each grid-cell year without discriminating between types of armed conflict (ACLED classifies events into one of six event types: battles, explosions/remote violence, protests, riots, strategic developments, and violence against civilians). All results hold, alleviating the concern that armed conflict is driving the results (see **Appendix Table 2**).

Readers may also propose that UNESCO already knows that some World Heritage sites are in “danger,” as it marks about 10% of sites on its official inscription list as in danger. This is based on Article 11 of the UNESCO charter, which states:

The Committee shall establish, keep up to date and publish, whenever circumstances shall so require, under the title of "List of World Heritage in Danger", a list of the property appearing in the World Heritage List for the conservation of which major operations are necessary and for which assistance

has been requested under this Convention. This list shall contain an estimate of the cost of such operations. The list may include only such property forming part of the cultural and natural heritage as is threatened by serious and specific dangers, such as the threat of disappearance caused by accelerated deterioration, large-scale public or private projects or rapid urban or tourist development projects; destruction caused by changes in the use or ownership of the land; major alterations due to unknown causes; abandonment for any reason whatsoever; the outbreak or the threat of an armed conflict; calamities and cataclysms; serious fires, earthquakes, landslides; volcanic eruptions; changes in water level, floods and tidal waves. The Committee may at any time, in case of urgent need, make a new entry in the List of World Heritage in Danger and publicize such entry immediately.

This danger includes things like over-tourism and large-scale development projects, which is the type of conflict our models should be capturing. This begs the question of whether the conflict at these sites, the ones UNESCO has already deemed “in danger,” is driving our results. As such, we re-estimate the models excluding from the sample the sites that UNESCO has already marked as in danger, and find that the vast majority of our findings hold with the exclusion of conflict directed toward IGOs, where the  $p$ -values just miss standard significance (see **Appendix Figure 3**). This is evidence for the existence of danger that does not fall within the categories formally acknowledged by UNESCO.

Finally, our analysis does not account for sites that have been placed on UNESCO’s Tentative List, which is an inventory of properties that States Parties intend to forward for future nomination.<sup>5</sup> This list includes sites located in 185 out of the 194 States Parties to the World Heritage Convention. Given that it may be the discussion of becoming a UNESCO World Heritage site itself that is inciting conflict, in future research, we will consider the impact of listing on the Tentative List for those sites with historically available data. However, we note that excluding these sites is likely only biasing our results downward – there is likely conflict occurring at these tentative sites that we are not accounting for. As such, we hypothesize that inclusion of these sites should only make our results stronger.

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<sup>5</sup> <https://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/>

## **Corroborative Caselets**

### ***The Taj Mahal***

A further limitation of our large-n empirical design is the abstraction from the cultural richness of the sites, the identity of specific political actors that are the source and target of protests, as well as the specific themes of those protests. To provide one powerful example consistent with our quantitative analysis, we turn to the Taj Mahal, an immense mausoleum of white marble in Agra, India which was inscribed on the World Heritage List in 1983. The property also includes a mosque, a guest house, a main gateway, and other buildings. The effective conservation of the Taj became a pressing issue shortly after its construction was completed and continues to be a constant problem today. Conservation issues are caused by a combination of human-made threats, such as residues left on the marble white surfaces by the many thousands of visitors that walk and touch the monument every year, industrial and automobile pollution, as well as water pollution from the nearby Yamuna River. Threats from development projects, such as the Taj Corridor, which was later halted due to corruption, as well as a lack of a proper management plan, have exacerbated pollution and tourism pressures creating a complex recipe of grievances and resulting conflict.

Starting in 1984, the Supreme Court of India issued several rulings to save the Taj Mahal. In 1996, the Supreme Court banned the use of coal/coke in industries located in the Taj Trapezium Zone (a 50-km area around the Taj Mahal complex). Many of the residents of Agra, however, have no access to electricity and so continue to rely on traditional fuels despite the government ban. In addition, the local population blames the government for the lack of access to clean water, proper sewerage, and garbage collection that they say contributes to urban pollution impacting the monument.

Related political threats highlight how religious tensions within India are playing out under the pretense of conservation concerns around the Taj Mahal monumental complex. In 2018, two high court judges told state officials: "Either we shut down the Taj or demolish it, or you restore it," a sentiment that has resonated with the BJP's rightwing Hindutva lobby that seeks to elide the past, present, and future of the monument. The Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh has publicly stated that the marble mausoleum does not represent "Indian culture." Other politicians argued that the Taj was built over a demolished Hindu temple, and they have insisted the name of the Taj Mahal be changed. In 2018, Hindu nationalists vandalized a gate to the Taj, claiming it was blocking the way to a Hindu temple. Later that year, Archaeological Survey of India forbid Muslims to worship in the mosque inside the Taj complex, except on Fridays.

In 2022, Rajneesh Singh of the BJP filed a petition, which was later dismissed by the Supreme Court, requesting that the Archaeological Survey of India reveal what was hidden behind 22 closed doors in the monument. He claimed that Hindu idols were kept there, based on spurious claims by historians and Hindu groups about the existence of an earlier Shiva temple. That same year the Supreme Court issued a ruling to ban commercial activities within a 500-meter radius of the Taj Mahal, and it is estimated that about 50,000 people could become jobless as a result of this ruling.

The Taj Mahal demonstrates the myriad ways politics contribute to increasing tensions that undermine the 1972 World Heritage Convention's mission of fostering peace and sustainable development at World Heritage sites.

### ***Mapungubwe Cultural Landscape***

Mapungubwe Cultural Landscape in South Africa was inscribed on the World Heritage List in 2003 on the basis of its archaeological remains. The site's area covers nearly thirty

thousand hectares, and within that there are three major sites (Schroda, Leopard's Kopje, and Mapungubwe Hill) and their satellite settlements. Mapungubwe is frequently referred to as Southern Africa's first Indigenous or precolonial kingdom (900-1300 AD).

Mapungubwe is part of a category of World Heritage sites that recognizes that many landscapes are the 'combined works of nature and humankind' and 'express a long and intimate relationship between peoples and their natural environment' (Rössler 2003). While the cultural landscapes category has become an increasingly popular venue for site inscription, it can pose myriad challenges as has been witnessed in South Africa.

At the time of the site's inscription, UNESCO's Advisory Bodies that examined the nomination raised many concerns about the site's borders and buffer zone, and advocated postponing the nomination until those concerns were addressed (Meskell, 2016). However, after much political lobbying, the Committee proceeded to inscribe the site, which had devastating consequences, establishing a loophole that subsequently allowed coal mining at the edge of the park (Esterhuysen, 2009; Meskell, 2011, 2016; Swanepoel & Schoeman, 2010). Prior to 2003, there were two diamond mining operations and several more pending coal mining applications around Mapungubwe. According to UNESCO regulations, no mining may be conducted within the actual World Heritage sites or the surrounding buffer zone. Over the years, the Committee has constantly debated these extractive industries in the buffer zone. However, South Africa, in cooperation with some mining corporations such as Coal of Africa, has sought to change and reduce the buffer zone that was proposed in 2003 (Meskell, 2016). In addition, SANParks, the organization responsible for the park's management, has downplayed the site's archaeological values in favor of the more profitable nature-based safari tourism (Meskell, 2009, 2012). This approach marginalizes the very cultural elements of Mapungubwe that led to its inscription (Meskell 2016).

While the mining might have been done underground, mining executives chose to continue with the more profitable open-cast mining. Other mining-related hazards include the impact of dust, chemicals, noise, smell, and light on local health and well-being; unlawful bush clearing; and pumping water from the Limpopo River, which will reduce the water table. Additional construction includes an airfield and new access roads to accommodate the estimated arrival of a truck every 1.75 minutes during the day and night (Eloundou & Avango, 2012, p. 31). All of these interventions have jeopardized the site's integrity. Ultimately, the lack of a clearly-defined buffer zone in 2003 has allowed South Africa to claim UNESCO compliance while permitting future mining rights to be awarded compromising not only conservation but community health and well-being (Meskell, 2006).

## **Conclusion**

Our analysis of the causal impact of World Heritage List site inscription on conflict proximate to World Heritage sites found that, consistent with our theoretical arguments, openings or connections to the liberal international economic order cause conflict in the geographic region influenced by the opening. Furthermore, this conflict is directed from the short-term losers of the opening and towards the local winners as well as national and international political actors representing the liberal economic order. In specifications that include PRIO grid-cell fixed effects as well as time varying control variables known to influence conflict, we see clear and consistent patterns of post-inscription conflict escalation from labor groups and towards intergovernmental organizations, national governments and businesses.

Our empirical analyses offer important insights for scholars of international political economy as well as practitioners in international organizations and the private sector. While scholars have long analyzed backlash against the liberal economic order, quantitative empirical

work has lagged or been unable to precisely test theoretical arguments set forth and explored in case studies. While there is ample empirical evidence that conflict follows liberalization, the precise mechanisms driving this conflict and the actors involved have not heretofore been causally demonstrated in a large-N empirical design. Our results leverage a context in which substantial economic resources flow into a precise geographic area post-liberalization to highlight that protest is not merely driven by pre-existing economic underperformance accentuated by a crisis nor a temporal gap between adjustment costs and long-term benefits as is the case in many economic reform programs. Rather, our analysis supports the generalizability of qualitative case study work or comparative research highlighting the importance of short-term losers from liberalization in mobilizing the opposition which targets different actors against which they are aggrieved.

Practically, these results support additional efforts by those who support and, in particular, stand to benefit from liberalization, and may be inattentive to the short-term costs and losers of such liberalization, to compensate the losers from such opening *ex ante*. In contrast to the rhetoric of World Heritage list inscription promoting peace and development, we find a causal link to conflict that can undermine economic development. Our results heighten calls to decision makers within the World Heritage Convention to increase their vigilance to the socio-economic and political drivers of conflict at World Heritage sites and to refrain from actions that might undermine UNESCO's organizational mission of fostering peace and development through global conservation. The same strategic prescription applies to businesses who seek to benefit from sustainable tourism at World Heritage sites.

Furthermore, this lesson is likely of even greater importance to supporters or beneficiaries of reform more broadly in the liberal economic order. Note that that in our context, economic resource inflow is front-loaded and there was limited, if any, economic underperformance in the lead-up to liberalization, we still observed escalation of conflict for

three years from losers and for two to six years at different economic and political interests. In contexts with more up-front economic loss and longer payback periods, we might expect the conflict to be even greater and more long-lived. Given recent backsliding from the liberal economic order, policy or strategic efforts to minimize such conflict may play an important role in limiting the support for nationalist, populist and nativist opponents of the liberal economic order more broadly.

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## Appendix Figure 1: The Goldstein Scale

223 Military attack; clash; assault	-10.0	091 Ask for information	0.1
211 Seize position or possessions	-9.2	011 Surrender, yield to order, submit to arrest	0.6
222 Nonmilitary destruction/injury	-8.7	012 Yield position; retreat; evacuate	0.6
221 Noninjury destructive action	-8.3	031 Meet with; send note	1.0
182 Armed force mobilization, exercise, display; military buildup	-7.6	095 Entreat; plead; appeal to; beg	1.2
195 Break diplomatic relations	-7.0	101 Offer proposal	1.5
173 Threat with force specified	-7.0	061 Express regret; apologize	1.8
174 Ultimatum; threat with negative sanction and time limit	-6.9	032 Visit; go to	1.9
172 Threat with specific negative nonmilitary sanction	-5.8	066 Release and/or return persons or property	1.9
193 Reduce or cut off aid or assistance; act to punish/deprive	-5.6	013 Admit wrongdoing; apologize, retract statement	2.0
181 Nonmilitary demonstration, walk out on	-5.2	062 Give state invitation	2.5
201 Order person or personnel out of country	-5.0	054 Assure; reassure	2.8
202 Expel organization or group	-4.9	033 Receive visit; host	2.8
150 Issue order or command, insist, demand compliance	-4.9	065 Suspend sanctions; end punishment; call truce	2.9
171 Threat without specific negative sanction stated	-4.4	082 Agree to future action or procedure, to meet, or to negotiate	3.0
212 Detain or arrest person(s)	-4.4	092 Ask for policy assistance	3.4
192 Reduce routine international activity; recall officials	-4.1	093 Ask for material assistance	3.4
112 Refuse; oppose; refuse to allow	-4.0	041 Praise, hail, applaud, extend condolences	3.4
111 Turn down proposal; reject protest, demand, threat	-4.0	042 Endorse other's policy or position; give verbal support	3.6
194 Halt negotiation	-3.8	053 Promise other future support	4.5
122 Denounce; denigrate; abuse	-3.4	051 Promise own policy support	4.5
160 Give warning	-3.0	052 Promise material support	5.2
132 Issue formal complaint or protest	-2.4	064 Grant privilege; diplomatic recognition; de facto relations	5.4
121 Charge; criticize; blame; disapprove	-2.2	073 Give other assistance	6.5
191 Cancel or postpone planned event	-2.2	081 Make substantive agreement	6.5
131 Make complaint (not formal)	-1.9	071 Extend economic aid; give, buy, sell, loan, borrow	7.4
063 Grant asylum	-1.1	072 Extend military assistance	8.3
142 Deny an attributed policy, action, role or position	-1.1		
141 Deny an accusation	-0.9		
023 Comment on situation	-0.2		
102 Urge or suggest action or policy	-0.1		
021 Explicit decline to comment	-0.1		
094 Request action; call for	-0.1		
025 Explain or state policy; state future position	0.0		

**Appendix Table 1: Conflict toward IGOs**

VARIABLES	(1) 2 years before inscription	(2) 1 year before inscription	(3) Year of inscription	(4) 1 year after inscription	(5) 2 years after inscription	(6) 3 years after inscription	(7) 4 years after inscription	(8) 5 years after inscription	(9) 6 years after inscription	(10) 7 years after inscription	(11) 8 years after inscription	(12) 9 years after inscription	(13) 10 years after inscription
World Heritage site	-0.141**	-0.140**	-0.0778	-0.136*	-0.101	-0.0983	-0.0288	0.0568	0.0494	0.0917	0.126	0.177**	0.199**
	(0.0705)	(0.0691)	(0.0673)	(0.0728)	(0.0731)	(0.0736)	(0.0742)	(0.0753)	(0.0765)	(0.0783)	(0.0805)	(0.0827)	(0.0858)
GDP (ln)	-0.0481*	-0.0433	-0.0410	-0.0481*	-0.0315	-0.0359	-0.0197	-0.0238	-0.0369	-0.0156	-0.0248	-0.0251	-0.0364
	(0.0279)	(0.0265)	(0.0254)	(0.0252)	(0.0251)	(0.0251)	(0.0252)	(0.0258)	(0.0265)	(0.0277)	(0.0297)	(0.0319)	(0.0338)
Population (ln)	-0.00469	-0.00254	-0.00324	-0.00645	-0.0140	-0.0179	-0.00627	-0.0218*	-0.0193	-0.00441	0.00478	0.0103	0.0216
	(0.0136)	(0.0131)	(0.0126)	(0.0125)	(0.0124)	(0.0125)	(0.0125)	(0.0127)	(0.0130)	(0.0137)	(0.0147)	(0.0165)	(0.0196)
Excluded groups	0.0289	0.0348		0.115***	0.0983***	0.0511*	0.0145	-0.00482	-0.0420	0.0802***	-0.103***	-0.113***	-0.149***
	(0.0295)	(0.0284)		(0.0274)	(0.0276)	(0.0277)	(0.0279)	(0.0282)	(0.0285)	(0.0288)	(0.0292)	(0.0299)	(0.0311)
													(0.0311)
Constant	2.560***	2.455***	2.437***	2.992***	2.677***	2.499***	2.276***	2.364***	2.852***	2.365***	2.206***	1.648***	2.291***
	(0.461)	(0.438)	(0.422)	(0.417)	(0.416)	(0.415)	(0.417)	(0.426)	(0.436)	(0.456)	(0.486)	(0.523)	(0.558)
Observations	250,197	262,297	272,210	270,387	268,173	265,804	263,191	260,027	256,447	251,884	246,245	240,359	233,323
R-squared	0.004	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.002
Number of gid	30,921	31,274	31,487	31,485	31,473	31,459	31,444	31,427	31,405	31,358	31,236	31,139	31,002
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Appendix Table 2: Conflict toward government**

VARIABLES	(1) 2 years before inscription	(2) 1 year before inscription	(3) Year of inscription	(4) 1 year after inscription	(5) 2 years after inscription	(6) 3 years after inscription	(7) 4 years after inscription	(8) 5 years after inscription	(9) 6 years after inscription	(10) 7 years after inscription	(11) 8 years after inscription	(12) 9 years after inscription	(13) 10 years after inscription
World Heritage site	-0.0744 (0.0471)	-0.103** (0.0456)	-0.116*** (0.0443)	-0.161*** (0.0474)	-0.190*** (0.0479)	-0.190*** (0.0485)	-0.181*** (0.0492)	-0.161*** (0.0499)	-0.139*** (0.0508)	-0.0828 (0.0520)	-0.0413 (0.0535)	0.0183 (0.0549)	0.0785 (0.0565)
GDP (ln)	0.106*** (0.0136)	0.0789*** (0.0128)	0.0597*** (0.0122)	0.0588*** (0.0122)	0.0540*** (0.0123)	0.0407*** (0.0124)	0.0406*** (0.0125)	0.0348*** (0.0126)	0.0268** (0.0129)	0.0269** (0.0136)	0.0121 (0.0144)	-0.00127 (0.0155)	- (0.0164)
Population (ln)	0.0249*** (0.00621)	0.0204*** (0.00591)	0.0202*** (0.00563)	0.0189*** (0.00551)	-0.0132** (0.00544)	-0.0124** (0.00539)	- (0.00540)	- (0.00544)	-0.0103* (0.00556)	- (0.00581)	-0.0153** (0.00625)	-0.00971 (0.00693)	-0.0146* (0.00817)
Excluded groups	-0.0229 (0.0160)	-0.0249 (0.0154)	- (0.0149)	-0.0303** (0.0150)	0.00844 (0.0151)	-0.00526 (0.0151)	-0.00142 (0.0152)	-0.00981 (0.0154)	- (0.0157)	0.0507*** (0.0162)	0.0647*** (0.0166)	0.0530*** (0.0172)	0.0573*** (0.0179)
Constant	-0.370* (0.213)	-0.000846 (0.202)	0.278 (0.193)	0.433** (0.192)	0.428** (0.193)	0.526*** (0.193)	0.522*** (0.194)	0.531*** (0.196)	0.930*** (0.201)	1.126*** (0.210)	1.194*** (0.223)	1.271*** (0.240)	2.250*** (0.254)
Observations	626,022	654,824	680,619	672,538	663,225	654,221	645,124	635,064	623,828	609,752	593,876	577,203	559,624
R-squared	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Number of gid	46,555	46,809	46,937	46,934	46,913	46,908	46,903	46,894	46,871	46,806	46,731	46,646	46,523
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Appendix Table 3: Conflict toward business**

VARIABLES	(1) 2 years before inscription	(2) 1 year before inscription	(3) Year of inscription	(4) 1 year after inscription	(5) 2 years after inscription	(6) 3 years after inscription	(7) 4 years after inscription	(8) 5 years after inscription	(9) 6 years after inscription	(10) 7 years after inscription	(11) 8 years after inscription	(12) 9 years after inscription	(13) 10 years after inscription
World Heritage Site	-0.0659	-0.0913	-0.0913	-0.132**	-0.156**	-0.0977	-0.0777	-0.000287	0.0261	0.0202	0.0467	0.0944	0.107
GDP (ln)	(0.0612)	(0.0591)	(0.0591)	(0.0627)	(0.0629)	(0.0630)	(0.0634)	(0.0640)	(0.0648)	(0.0662)	(0.0678)	(0.0694)	(0.0711)
Population (ln)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.0459**	-	-0.0377*	-0.0463**	-0.0223
Excluded groups	0.0698***	0.0671***	0.0671***	0.0635***	0.0698***	0.0661***	0.0594***	0.0617***		0.0673***			
Constant	(0.0204)	(0.0192)	(0.0192)	(0.0177)	(0.0175)	(0.0174)	(0.0174)	(0.0175)	(0.0178)	(0.0186)	(0.0198)	(0.0214)	(0.0224)
	-0.0129	-0.0125	-0.0125	-0.00664	-0.00286	-0.00280	-0.0131*	-0.0158**	-0.0157**	-0.0160**	-	-	-0.0156
	(0.00945)	(0.00875)	(0.00875)	(0.00774)	(0.00748)	(0.00732)	(0.00723)	(0.00722)	(0.00732)	(0.00760)	0.0312***	0.0280***	
	-0.0554**	-0.00122	-0.00122	0.0515**	0.0563***	0.0491**	0.0549***	0.0313	0.0290	0.00627	-0.00916	-0.00409	-0.0268
	(0.0220)	(0.0211)	(0.0211)	(0.0203)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.0208)	(0.0211)	(0.0216)	(0.0220)	(0.0227)	(0.0235)
Observations	2.078***	2.010***	1.839***	2.291***	2.378***	1.949***	2.112***	2.145***	2.110***	2.810***	2.295***	2.147***	1.678***
R-squared	(0.326)	(0.306)	(0.289)	(0.282)	(0.278)	(0.276)	(0.274)	(0.275)	(0.280)	(0.291)	(0.309)	(0.333)	(0.351)
Number of gid	454,573	478,809	500,016	496,769	492,943	489,258	485,379	480,684	475,351	468,113	459,504	450,064	440,385
Country FE	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
Year FE	42,730	43,052	43,239	43,236	43,224	43,222	43,214	43,200	43,183	43,149	43,098	43,030	42,964
	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES





Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Appendix Table 4: Conflict from labor**

VARIABLES	(1) 2 years before inscription	(2) 1 year before inscription	(3) Year of inscription	(4) 1 year after inscription	(5) 2 years after inscription	(6) 3 years after inscription	(7) 4 years after inscription	(8) 5 years after inscription	(9) 6 years after inscription	(10) 7 years after inscription	(11) 8 years after inscription	(12) 9 years after inscription	(13) 10 years after inscription
World Heritage site	-0.0665 (0.0899)	-0.0697 (0.0861)	-0.203** (0.0849)	-0.200** (0.0932)	-0.178* (0.0937)	-0.116 (0.0940)	-0.140 (0.0946)	-0.0514 (0.0956)	0.0276 (0.0962)	0.0556 (0.0985)	0.0772 (0.101)	0.0702 (0.103)	0.123 (0.106)
GDP (ln)	0.0402 (0.0371)	0.0218 (0.0344)	0.0218 (0.0344)	0.0707** (0.0320)	0.0492 (0.0317)	0.0449 (0.0313)	0.0577* (0.0313)	0.0816** (0.0317)	0.107*** (0.0324)	0.0971*** (0.0338)	0.119*** (0.0362)	0.0899** (0.0393)	0.0736* (0.0411)
Population (ln)	0.0510*** (0.0185)	0.0321* (0.0172)	0.0218 (0.0344)	0.0376** (0.0157)	0.0230 (0.0152)	0.0123 (0.0149)	-0.00276 (0.0147)	-0.00869 (0.0147)	-0.000672 (0.0149)	-0.00134 (0.0155)	-0.0113 (0.0165)	0.00662 (0.0181)	-0.0341 (0.0210)
Excluded groups	-0.0466 (0.0326)	-0.0311 (0.0310)	0.0421*** (0.0161)	0.0271 (0.0298)	0.0720** (0.0300)	0.118*** (0.0299)	0.0796*** (0.0301)	-0.000927 (0.0305)	-0.0160 (0.0311)	0.0237 (0.0321)	0.0397 (0.0325)	0.0632* (0.0335)	0.114*** (0.0350)
Constant	-1.316** (0.618)	-0.834 (0.573)	-1.358** (0.541)	-1.659*** (0.533)	-1.107** (0.528)	-1.669*** (0.520)	-1.432*** (0.516)	-1.589*** (0.523)	-2.004*** (0.532)	-1.492*** (0.554)	-1.814*** (0.591)	-1.465** (0.639)	-1.078 (0.672)
Observations	229,996	244,240	255,469	253,561	251,477	249,676	247,721	245,260	242,837	239,498	235,291	230,782	226,326
R-squared	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
Number of gid	30,408	30,863	31,119	31,086	31,050	31,031	31,019	30,982	30,960	30,884	30,744	30,594	30,488
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Appendix Figure 2: Robustness to inclusion of ACLED



Appendix Figure 3: Robustness to exclusion of sites in danger

